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IN-'-"fHE- SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
J

ROBERT OTTLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,(
-vs. -

i

\ Ca::w No. lllt :

LOIS R. HILL,

!

Def cudw1 t-Rcs po11dc11t.

-- APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF 'L1HE KIND OF CA8E
This action involves the wrongful death of a minor
child. Plaintiff, the father of the child, brought an
action to recover general damages for thP wrongfni
death and special damages for medical, hm;pital and
funeral expenses.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
I
'l'he case was tried before the Honorable Leonard I
W. Elton, District Judge, sitting without a jury. TlH I
court found the issues of liability in favor of the plaintifl
and awarded general damages for wrongful death in th
amount of $6,500.00. The court furthPr found that rPaso1 1
, .-.able. expenses of $1~706.56 were incurred for funeral, ,
_ medkal and hospital services, but refused to award said ·
1

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff appeals only from that portion of the judgrnent wherein the trial court refused to award special
damages. Plaintiff seeks that the case be remanded to
the trial court with instructions to modify the judgment
by including the full amount of special damages in the
award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's appeal is based upon the findings of fact
made by the trial court. Plaintiff's position is that th.e
findings of fact would as a matter of law require an
award for the full amount of plaintiff's special damages,
and that the conclusions of law as made by the trial
court are erroneous. The findings of fact of the court
m set forth in full as follows: (R-26) :
1. Plaintiff, Robert Ottley, is the father of Trent

Lee Ottley and brings this action for wrongful death pur-

suant to the provisions of Section 78-11-6, Utah Code

Annotated.
2. On or about June 22, 1966, at approximately 21st
South and 1140 East Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah,
Trent Lee Ottley, age four, was hit in a pedestrian
not:1swalk by a motor vehicle operated by the defendant,

Lois R. Hill;_ as a resn1t of the collision, 'J'n•nl L1 ,
Ottley received injuries urnsing his dPath \\·hich occnnr'r!
on June 24, 1966.

:3. The death of '!'rent

LP<'

Ottley and the illjuri 1·,;

rceeived by him prior to death were proximatd.v caui;1<d
hy the negligence of

tlH~

defendant.

4. The child 'l1re11t Lee

Ottle~-

wa:,.; not coulributoril)

negligent, nor were eitlwr of his parents contrilrntorih
negligent.
5. Plaintiff has suffered general damagt>:,.; for

death of Trent Lee Ottley in the amount of Six

!!11'

'l'hon~

and Five Hundred ($6,500.00) Dollarn.
6. Prior to the death of the child, Trent LeP Ottle)',
hospital and doctor expenses were incmred by plaintiff
for medical treatment in the sum of Eleven Hundred
Eighty Dollars and Eighty Cents ($1,180.80); said expenses were reasonably incurred and were directly related to the accident; following the death of the child,
funeral and burial expenses were incurred by plaiutiff
in the amount of Five Hundred '11 wenty Five Dollars and
Se_venty Six Cents ($525.76) and that the amount of
said expense was reasonable.
')

<>

7. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had in full
forcP and effect policies of insurance as follows:

(a) A policy of insurance with State Farm Mutual Insurance Company in which plaintiff
in the named insured providing coverage for
medical expenses to the named insured and
to his relatives who sustain bodily injury
by reason of being struck by a motor vehicle.
Under this policy, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company paid to plaintiff the sum
of $500.00. A copy of this policy is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference made
a part of these findings.
(b) Policies of insurance with Blue Cross and
Blue Shield in which plaintiff is named as
the subscriber providing coverage for medical
expense to the subscriber and to his family
dependents for doctor, hospital and medical'
expenses. Under this policy, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield paid the sum of $1,009.30 to
apply against medical and hospital expenses.
A copy of the Blue Cross - Blue Shield policies is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
by reference made a part of these findings.
8. Premiums on all of the policies of insurance refoned to in paragraph 7 herein were paid by the plaintiff.
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9. Other than the }JOlieiPs of 1110,,nrance rl'fnre(l
above, 1'n•nt Lcl' Ottlt>y hall no ('state.

111

Based npon tltl' ahon• findingc; of fact, the cotir1
conclnded tliat th<' proceed:-; of" the insuranc(~ 1>olicit•,
('.Ollstitnt<·d an <·;-;tate on tlt<' part of Trent Lee ()ttJ 1•1
and awardL•d svecial damages of only $197.2(), lwing
the difference between the actnal <"xpenses and the proeeeds from the insurance policies.

AHGUMEN'r
POINT I

'l'HE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO lNCLliDE
IN PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT THE FULL AMOUJ'\T
OF SPECIAL DAl\IAGES FOR HOSPI1'AL, DOCTOH,
FUNERAL AND BURIAL EXPENSES.
(a) The claim for hospital, doctor, fu11eral and burial

expenses is a direct and primary claim of the
father, .for which he is entitled to rrcovcr.

The trial court in reaching the condnsion that it did
relied primarily upon the case of ill orriso11 vs. Perry,
104 Utah 151; 140 P.2d 772. In that case the Utah conrt
held in an action involving the death of an adult that
before the plaintiff could recover funeral expenses it
must be shown that the estate is insolvent and unable
to pay such expenses and that the plaintiff or one of thr
heirs has paid or has entered into a legally enforceable
obligation to pay the funeral expenses. The court further noted that in such a case involving the death of an
adult the heir is not }("gally obligated to pay funeral
expense:,; hut the e::;tate has tlH'. primary obligation. 'l'he

5

holding of the Morrison case is but a logical application
oi the adult wrongful death statute (78-11-7, Utah Code
Annotated), the theory of which is not survivorship, but
lo create a new cause of action on the part of the heirs
for damages suffered by them. In re Behm's estate,
117 Utah 151, 213 P. 2d 657.
Plaintiff takes no exception to the holding of the
Morrison vs. Perry case, but submits that it has no application to the facts of the instant case, and in fact supports the position of appellant. Here the father is not
attempting to recover special damages suffered by the
child under a survivorship theory, but is attempting to
recover his own special damages.
In finding No. 9 of the trial court it is established
that Trent Lee Ottley, the child, had no estate other than
the insurance policies. It was also established that Trent
Lee Ottley was four years old at the time of his death;
that the named insured under the policies was not the
child, but the plaintiff father; and that the father paid
the premiums on the policies. The only thing the child
had to do with the insurance was that by reason of being
a dependent of the father, his medical and funeral exlll'Irnes were covered under the policy. The child's name
i" not even mentioned in either of the policies.
l 1nder the above circumstances, the trial court could
not possibly correctly conclude that the child had an
1 ·~tatP. If there were any such estate, the only conceiv-

6

ahle" asset would he a claim against the insura1H·p ro1tipan:v. yet the case law in r tali is clear that the child
had no such claim and that the claim would belong to lhi~
father and not the child. 'l'he leading case is (J:otc1 tau
I'S. LaJiout, 9 l'.tah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022. In that cas1'
a minor child, through hit> guardian ad litem, brought
un action to recover damages for assault and batter}.
The father was not a party to the suit. In refusing to
award the child special damages for medical expe1ts1·;;.
the court held as follows :
"This action was by David through hi::; guardian ad litem, and his father was 11ot a party
thereto. The father, not David, sufferrd damagciwhen he necessarily incurred these expem;es, and
the action for their recovery must be brought, if
at all, by him."
'J'hus the Utah court has clearly recognized that the
damages suffered by a minor child for medical expense~
are suffered by the parent, not the child. This is in
accordance with well recognized legal concepts, of wltil'h
the general law is stated at G7 C.J.S. Pure1d a11cl Child.
Section 30, as follows:
"An injury to a minor child gives rise to two
causes of action, one on behalf of the child for
pain and suffering ... and the other on behalf of
the parent for ... expenses of treatment."
Under the~ policies of insurance in the instant cas 1• '
coverage would not be ext(mded unless the insured in
curred the expenses. Since under the Ostertag case medical expenses and funeral expenses are incurred and
chargeable to the fatlwr, nC>ithcr the child nor its pstati• '

7

l'onkl have made any claim against the insurance comtiaH>. 'l'hns the child had no estate. It is the father who

ar'11lally suffered the special damages and the father who

L1rings this action for the recovery. The trial court was
\\'rong in precluding his recovery.
~\'en
1·~tate

if it were to be shown that the child had an

consisting of other assets (which the findings

show that he did not have) it should make no difference
inasmnclt as the father would still be chargeable and
lPgally liable for the medical and funeral expenses of his
minor child.
( h) The fact that plaintiff was partly indemnified

for his loss by his own insitrance does not preclude him from recovering the full amount of
the special damages.

] Iaving established that the claim for medical and
funeral expenses belongs to the father and not the child,
tJt,, is,.;ut• arises as to whether the father is precluded
from recovery because he had hospitalization, medical

or funeral insurance covering the loss. This involves an
application of the well known "Collateral Source Rule"
11hich is generally to the effect that benefits received by
<1

iilaintiff from a source wholly independent of and

\'ollatt•ral to the wrongdoer will not diminish the damages
otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer. See 22 Am.
.f;u. 2d Damages, Section 206.
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The Collateral Sonrce Rnk~ has been exl<·n,;iv~h
applied to cases involving health, accident, hospitalization and medical insurance. \Vith respect to the insurance cases, the g('neral rnlc is 0d forth at 22 Am . .Jw.
2d Darnagcs, Section 210, which provides as follows:

"It is well settled rule of damages that the
amount recoverable for tortious personal injuriP.,
is not decreased by the fact that the in.i nrrd party
has been wholly or partly indemnified for tl1P
loss by proceeds of accident insuranc\~ when· the
tort feasor did not contribute to the payment of
the premiums of such insurance."
Additional authority nrn)T be found at 13 A.L.R. 2d 335 in
an annotation entitled "Hotipitalization and

~IPdieal

surance as Affecting Damages RPeoverable for lnjnry

In01

Wrongful Death." There the author recognizes the W'lleral rule that in most instances the damages recoverabh·
for a wrong are not diminished hy the fact that the
party injured has been compensated by insurance, the
procurement of which the wrongdoer did not contribute.
Later cases all recognizing the general rule are as follows: Ger sick vs. Shilling (California), 218 P.2d 583;
Pitblix Cab Comp(rny

'i·.

Colorado Nati.011al Hm1k (Colo-

rado) 338 P.2d 702; Truitt vs. Gaiues, 199 F. Supp. 1-1:3:
Finley P. Smith, Inc. vs. Schectman (Florida), 132 So.

2d 460; Taylor vs. Jennison (Kc11tiicky), 335 SW 2d 902;
Conley vs. Foster (Kentitcky), 335 SW 2d 904; Baltimorr
Transit Company vs. Harroll (Maryland), 141A 2d Hl~:
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l(ickha111 vs. Carter (Missouri), 335 SW 2d 83; Long
1 •.

La11rley (New Jersey), 171 At. 2d 1; Farb vs. Borsuk,

l~S N.Y.

Supp. 2d 413; Joiner vs. Fort (South Carolina),

'-'± NJ1; 2d, 719. Many of these cases involve fact situations

:il1ao:-;t idrntical to the instant case. For example Truitt
n·. Uaiues, siipra, wherein a father was held entitled to

reeonr the full amonnt of stipulated medical expenses

to a minor child regardless of a $1,000 payment
made undPr a separate medical payments insurance con-

tract.
Appellant is nnaware of any Utah cases involving
thP application of the Collateral Source Rule to cases

imolving hospitalization, medical or funeral insurance;
l1owe,·er, the case of Martin vs. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478,
1.s~J

P.2d l 27, would seem to support appellant's position.

fn Oiat case a motorist suing for injuries was not barred

l'rom recovering for loss of wages during the time she
11a~

disabled on the ground that she was paid by her

Plllploy<>r for these particular days, in view of evidence

that she obtained the compensation by drawing on her
a(·cumulated sick leave. It would seem that the~B should
he no significant difference in the Martin case and the

instant ease in that here, as in the Martin case, the
d('frtl(lant tortfeasor should not be entitled to benefit by
l1'ason of plaintiff's drawing upon medical and hospitalirntion insurance which was bought, maintained and paid
lor

by plaintiff.
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POINT II

THERE: IS NO RECORD O~ APPEAL TO SUPPORT
RESPONDENrl''S . CROSS - APPEAL AND R A I Tl
C:ROSS-APPEAL lS WI'l'HOlTrr MERIT.
Respondtont in thii:i action has filed a cro8s-appeal
c-laiming in her statement of points that the evide1irp
would require findings that the defendant wai:i not nr•gligent and that the minor child and his parents were contrihntorily negligent as a matter of law.
The evidence showed that the child, while crossmg

the strB~t with an older child, was hit by defendant's
automobile in a marked crosswalk. Another automobile,
ahead of defendant and in an adjoining lane of traffi(',
had stopped to let the children cross. 'l'here is ample
evidence in the record to support a finding of negligencP.
The fact that the child was only four years of age would
discount any finding of contributory negligence. Tlw
parents were not present at the time and there was no
evidence of any negligence on their part.
In any event it is impossible for the court to consider the merits of respondent's cross-appeal inasmuch
as respondent has failed to designate and include in the
record a copy of the transcript of evidence. It is stated
at 4 Am. Ji£r. 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 515, that
''facts not demonstrated on the record by the inclut>ion
therein of. the rele.~a,nt - supporting evidence cannot be
considered by
appellate court."

ari

1l.

This court has held in Mansfield vs. Sinaloa Land
,\ Frnll Company, 43 Utah 417, 134 P. 1017, that where
11!1· (•vidence is not before the appellate court, the findi 1igs of fact are not reviewable on appeal. See also Mc011i1 e rs. State Bank of Tremonton, 49 Utah 381, 164
I>. 49±, holding that there is a presumption that the findings of fact were justified by the evidence where an
aweal was based upon the judgment and no bill of excep1iom: ( n°·quired under former rules of procedure) was
furnishPd to the appellate court. See also Taylor vs.
htlonw Gold & Silver Mining Company, 51 Utah 500,
171 Pac. 147; Byron vs. Utah Copper Company, 53 Utah
l :Jl. 178 Pac. 53.
Inasmuch as there is no transcript on appeal, re'JX>mlPnt's cross-appeal must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the authorities herein cited, it is
rP~pedfully submitted that the judgment of the trial
('omt lw modified to include therein the full amount as
~rwcial damages suffered by the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
By BEN E. RAWLINGS
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorne!/s for plaintiff
and appellant

12

